047583eb9c
- .gitignore (Python, Node, RT/maldev hygiene, secrets) - README.md (project framing, stack, conventions, status) - CHANGELOG.md (team kickoff decisions Q1/Q2/Q3, T2/T3/T4, auth strategy) - tasks/spec-decisions.md (D-001..D-007 arbitrations on top of frozen spec) - tasks/todo.md (sprint 0 backlog: B0.* / F0.* / S0.* / R0.*) - tasks/lessons.md (empty, populated as work progresses) - backend/ frontend/ docs/ scaffolding Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Spec decisions log
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This file tracks implementation arbitrations *on top* of the frozen spec
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(`Projects/Mimic — Spec.md` in the RT-SecondBrain vault).
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Format: one entry per decision, newest first.
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---
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## 2026-05-21 — Team kickoff decisions
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### D-001 — SOC collaboration hypothesis
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**Context.** Devils-advocate flagged the sociological assumption that SOC analysts
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will cote in the live cockpit.
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**Decision.** Hypothesis accepted as-is. No paper PoC. Risk owned by lead RT.
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### D-002 — Mimic deployment location
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**Context.** Spec §6 NF-network did not pin where Mimic is physically deployed.
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**Decision.** Mimic runs on RT infrastructure. SOC client connects through the
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existing RT reverse proxy (Caddy, out of Mimic scope). Mimic → Mythic / Home C2
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through outbound VPN. RT R&D (TTP library, stealthy variants) never sits on
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client premises.
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### D-003 — Authentication strategy
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**Context.** Spec mentions OIDC Keycloak but lab onboarding cost is high.
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**Decision.** v1 ships **local auth** (username/password, bcrypt, Flask server-side
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sessions). v2 adds Keycloak OIDC. The RBAC model is **group-based from day one**,
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so OIDC will map claims to existing groups without touching application code.
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SOC sessions remain a distinct mechanism (`soc_session.token_opaque` bcrypt hash,
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clear token out-of-band).
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### D-004 — C2 credential storage (T2)
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**Context.** Engagement.config_json (encrypted JSON column) vs dedicated table.
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**Decision.** Dedicated table `c2_credential (id, engagement_id, c2_type,
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config_json_fernet, version, created_at, retired_at)`. Active row per engagement =
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`retired_at IS NULL`, highest version. Rotation = insert + retire previous.
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Fernet key in env, never in DB.
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### D-005 — Cleanup template variable sources (T3)
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**Context.** Jinja `{{outputs.X}}` source ambiguity.
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**Decision.** Two accessors:
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- `{{outputs.text}}` → `run_step.output_text` (stdout/UTF-8 text).
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- `{{outputs.blob("<key>")}}` → reads from `output_blob_ref`, hard cap **10 MB**
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(consistent with F8 evidence limit), UTF-8 decoding with latin-1 fallback,
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silent refusal + log entry if the blob is non-decodable.
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`regex_extract` always operates on the resulting string.
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### D-006 — SOC session token storage (T4)
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**Context.** `soc_session.token_opaque` storage form.
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**Decision.** bcrypt hash. Clear token generated server-side at session creation,
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returned **once** in the API response, delivered out-of-band to the SOC analyst.
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Never re-displayable.
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### D-007 — Reverse proxy scope
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**Context.** Mimic exposure to internet for SOC client access.
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**Decision.** Reverse proxy (Caddy + TLS + IP allowlist) handled by existing RT
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infrastructure. Mimic ships an HTTP listener on localhost only; the deployment
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playbook wires it behind the existing proxy.
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