Files
mimic-big/docs/api.md
knacky dd321c2cd0 docs: add api.md contract for sprint 1 + update changelog
- docs/api.md: contract the frontend consumes — base URL, auth transport
  (Flask session cookie, credentials: include), uniform error envelope,
  MA6 tenant-scope behaviour (404 not 403), per-endpoint shape for
  /auth/{login,logout,me} and /engagements GET/POST/GET-by-id, plus a
  worked example walking through CLI bootstrap → login → POST engagement →
  list → logout.
- CHANGELOG.md: sprint-1 entry summarising the three endpoints, the dev-
  only CORS, the AuthUser extension, the audit rows, and the test
  coverage.
2026-05-23 04:22:03 +02:00

4.9 KiB

Mimic API — sprint 1 surface

This document covers the endpoints the frontend is expected to call in sprint 1. Everything is JSON, every protected route relies on the Flask session cookie set by POST /api/v1/auth/login. CORS is enabled only when MIMIC_ENV=development and MIMIC_CORS_ORIGINS is set (the prod reverse proxy serves the SPA on the same origin).

Conventions

  • Base URL: /api/v1/.
  • Auth transport: Flask session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure in production). The browser must send credentials: "include" on every request.
  • Content negotiation: requests and responses use application/json.
  • Error envelope: failures return {"error": "<code>", "message": "<human>"} with the appropriate HTTP status. Codes are stable identifiers (snake_case), messages are human-readable but not localized.
Status Use
200 OK
201 Resource created
204 OK, no body
400 Malformed request (e.g. missing JSON body)
401 not_authenticated or invalid_credentials
403 forbidden — authenticated but missing permission
404 Resource not found (also returned for tenant-scope denials, see below)
422 Pydantic validation error
500 Internal — opaque, no leak

Tenant scope leak prevention (MA6 — F11)

RT operators only see engagements they are members of. Requests targeting an engagement they don't belong to return 404, never 403, so the existence of a neighbouring engagement is not leaked between teams. RT leads see everything.

Authentication

POST /api/v1/auth/login

Body:

{ "username": "alice@example.org", "password": "•••••" }

username maps to the user.email column server-side (kept "username" in the HTTP contract so future identity sources can route through the same endpoint).

Success — 200:

{
  "user_id": "0c9e3a3a-7c8b-4d5e-9f10-1a2b3c4d5e6f",
  "username": "alice@example.org",
  "display_name": "Alice",
  "role": "rt_lead",
  "permissions": ["engagement.create", "engagement.read", "..."],
  "groups": ["rt_lead"]
}

Failures (all 401, uniform message — no enumeration leak between "unknown user" and "wrong password"):

{ "error": "invalid_credentials", "message": "invalid username or password" }

The endpoint runs a bcrypt round against a dummy hash when the user does not exist, so request timing does not leak the username's existence either.

Side effects on success:

  • A Flask session is established (cookie set, marked permanent).
  • user.last_login_at is updated.
  • An auth.login audit row is written.

POST /api/v1/auth/logout

Requires an active session.

  • 204 No Content on success — cookie is cleared and an auth.logout audit entry is written.
  • 401 not_authenticated if there is no active session.

GET /api/v1/auth/me

Returns the current principal in the same shape as POST /login. The frontend calls this at boot to rehydrate the application state.

  • 200 with the CurrentUser payload when authenticated.
  • 401 not_authenticated when there is no session cookie or the user has been disabled since login.

Engagements

GET /api/v1/engagements/

Lists engagements visible to the caller (engagement.read permission).

  • RT lead: all engagements.
  • RT operator: only those for which a row in engagement_member ties the authenticated user to the engagement.

Response — 200:

[
  {
    "id": "•••",
    "client_name": "Demo Client",
    "description": null,
    "status": "draft",
    "c2_type": "mythic",
    "start_date": null,
    "end_date": null
  }
]

GET /api/v1/engagements/<eid>

Same payload shape as the list element. Returns 404 if the engagement does not exist or the caller is not a member (MA6).

POST /api/v1/engagements/

Creates an engagement (engagement.create permission).

Body:

{
  "client_name": "Demo Client",
  "description": "Internal Q3 drill",
  "c2_type": "mythic",
  "start_date": null,
  "end_date": null
}
  • 201 with the created engagement.
  • 422 on Pydantic validation failure (returns the per-field error list).
  • created_by_id is set from the current session.
  • An engagement.create audit row is written.

The RT lead currently does not get a per-engagement engagement_member row on creation; they see every engagement via the is_rt_lead() short-circuit. This will change in a future sprint when membership becomes the single scope authority.

Worked example

  1. Create a local admin from the CLI:
    .venv/bin/mimic-cli user create --email alice@example.org --type rt_lead
    
  2. POST /api/v1/auth/login with the credentials — receive the user payload plus the session cookie.
  3. POST /api/v1/engagements/ with a body — receive the engagement.
  4. GET /api/v1/engagements/ — see the new engagement in the list.
  5. POST /api/v1/auth/logout — session cleared.