Files
mimic-big/CHANGELOG.md
knacky df6294ed7b docs: align doc references with compose.yml rename (code-reviewer M1)
Three docs still referenced the old docker-compose.yml path. Replace
with compose.yml so a future reader cloning at this hash finds the
file at the documented path.

- CHANGELOG.md:31 — backend skeleton recap line.
- docs/architecture.md:28 — deployment artifacts note (D-010 scope).
- tasks/todo.md:9 — B0.1 task description.

Also adds a "CI follow-ups (sprint 1+)" section to tasks/todo.md
capturing the 3 MINOR + 6 NIT deferred from code-reviewer's review
of chore/podman-and-ci, plus a FERNET-KEY tracker for the secret
provisioning before c2_credential.config_fernet (D-004) is wired.
2026-05-22 19:49:16 +02:00

107 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown

# Changelog
All notable changes to Mimic. Format inspired by Keep a Changelog (https://keepachangelog.com).
Versioning starts at `0.1.0` when sprint 0 lands.
## [Unreleased]
### Team decisions (2026-05-21)
- **Q1** — SOC client collaboration in the live cockpit is assumed valid (no PoC sheet).
- **Q2** — Mimic is deployed on RT infrastructure (not at client). SOC client connects over
the internet through the existing RT reverse proxy (out of Mimic scope).
- **Q3** — Project framed as "improve the existing shared sheet workflow", not "rebuild Caldera".
- **T2** — C2 credentials stored in a dedicated `c2_credential` table with version + retirement
(Fernet-encrypted `config_json`). Active row per engagement = `retired_at IS NULL`, max version.
- **T3** — Jinja templating exposes two accessors: `{{outputs.text}}` (stdout) and
`{{outputs.blob("key")}}` (binary, 10 MB cap, UTF-8 with latin-1 fallback).
- **T4** — `soc_session.token_opaque` stores a bcrypt hash; the clear token is delivered
out-of-band and never re-displayable.
- **Auth** — v1: local user/password (bcrypt + Flask session). v2: Keycloak OIDC mapping
onto the same group model. RBAC is group-based from day one.
### Sprint 0 in progress
Repo skeleton, data model, `C2Connector` ABC, Jinja2 sandbox, local auth + RBAC, flat CRUD,
UX wireframes (mock data). No real connector, no reporting until PR1/PR2/PR3 land.
#### Backend skeleton (`feature/backend-skeleton`)
- `backend/` Python 3.12+ project: `pyproject.toml` (ruff, mypy strict, pytest, coverage 70 %),
`Makefile` (Docker/Podman auto-detect), multi-stage `Dockerfile`, `compose.yml` for
Postgres dev DB, `.env.example`.
- Full §8 data model in SQLAlchemy 2 typed mapped classes: `engagement`, `c2_credential`,
`host`, `user`, `group`, `permission`, `group_permission`, `user_group`,
`engagement_member`, `ttp`, `scenario`, `scenario_step`, `run`, `run_step`,
`run_step_cleanup`, `detection`, `evidence`, `report`, `soc_session`, `audit_log`.
No `ttp_version` table (D-009 / H32 reaffirmed).
- Alembic baseline migration `202605210001_initial_schema`: every table + enum + index +
idempotent `audit_log` grants for the write-only Postgres role. Seeds the three F11
groups (`rt_operator`, `rt_lead`, `soc_analyst`) and their permission set (D-008).
- `C2Connector` ABC + `Payload` / `TaskHandle` / `TaskResult` / `TaskStatus` dataclasses +
`PayloadType` enum + `ConnectorFactory` keyed on `c2_type`. Mythic payload map populated;
Home stays empty until PR2.
- Jinja2 `SandboxedEnvironment` + `regex_extract` filter (`google-re2` hard dependency per
D-011 / B1 — `RuntimeError` at boot if absent, no `re` fallback) + `{{ outputs.text }}` /
`{{ outputs.blob() }}` accessors reading gzip-compressed blobs (10 MB cap after
decompression, UTF-8 → latin-1).
- Group-based RBAC: `Permission` + `GroupName` + `GROUP_PERMISSIONS` mirror the F11 matrix;
`@require_perm` decorator + `AuthUser` Flask-Login wrapper that resolves the permission set
from the user's groups.
- bcrypt password helpers + SOC opaque token (256-bit url-safe, bcrypt-hashed at rest, plain
returned once).
- Hash-chained append-only audit writer (sprint 0 fills `prev_hash` / `row_hash` at insert;
verifier shipped in v2).
- Flat CRUD blueprints: engagements / hosts / TTPs / scenarios + scenario steps. F3 invariant
enforced (host.c2_type must match scenario.c2_type at compose time). Every mutation calls
the hash-chained audit writer (MA5); created rows carry `created_by_id` (MA4); listings and
per-engagement routes scope to `engagement_member` for RT operators (MA6 / F11).
- Content-addressed gzip blob store (`mimic.storage.blob`): streaming write with a `max_bytes`
cap (raises `BlobTooLarge` mid-stream — MA2), atomic rename, `0o750` directory mode.
- `mimic-cli` (click): `user create`, `db dump`, `db restore`.
- pytest baseline: **56 unit tests passing** (templating, regex_extract, password, soc_token,
RBAC matrix, connector factory, audit hash, blob CAS, migration seed parity). Integration
scaffold ready for testcontainers Postgres (`/healthz` smoke included).
#### Spec deltas applied in this sprint
Authoritative decisions implemented per `tasks/spec-decisions.md`:
- **D-008** — Seeded groups = exactly the three F11 roles, permission matrix from F11.
- **D-009** — No `ttp_version` table (H32 reaffirmed).
- **D-011** — `regex_extract` fails loudly on no-match (raises `TemplateError`).
- **D-012** — `output_blob_ref` stored in `MIMIC_BLOB_ROOT` (CAS gzip layout); evidence
files live under `MIMIC_EVIDENCE_ROOT` (flat per-engagement).
Implementation arbitrations logged in this sprint:
- **D-013** — `audit_log` hash chain (`prev_hash` / `row_hash`) shipped v1.
- **D-014** — UUID columns use SQLAlchemy 2 native `Uuid` mapping; no `type_annotation_map`
on the declarative base (Flask-SQLAlchemy incompatibility).
#### Code-review remediation (`12d131c` → `feature/backend-skeleton`)
- **B1** — Dropped the `re` stdlib fallback in `regex_extract`. `google-re2` is now a hard
dependency (B1 / D-011); the module raises `RuntimeError` at import if absent.
- **MA1** — Removed `scripts/postgres-init/00-roles.sql` (no more hardcoded `CHANGE_ME`
password). Audit-writer role provisioning is the playbook's responsibility (D-010);
`backend/README.md` documents the manual dev-only `CREATE ROLE` command.
- **MA2** — `store_blob` now accepts a binary stream + `max_bytes`, streams sha256+gzip in
64 KB chunks, and raises `BlobTooLarge` mid-stream (cleans up the temp file). No more
whole-buffer RAM load.
- **MA3** — Inlined the F11 permission matrix in the initial Alembic migration; the runtime
matrix is no longer imported there. A new unit test
(`test_migration_seed_matches_current_matrix`) fails if the two drift apart.
- **MA4** — `created_by_id = current_user.id` set in `engagement`, `ttp`, and `scenario`
create endpoints.
- **MA5** — Every mutation endpoint now writes an audit row through the hash-chained
`AuditWriter` (F13).
- **MA6** — RT operators only see engagements they are members of (`engagement_member` join
on list, membership probe on `get`/`put`/`delete`/`host`/`scenario`/...). RT leads bypass.
- **N4** — `gunicorn` declared in `pyproject.toml` dependencies (the Dockerfile `CMD` now
resolves correctly).
- **N6** — `tests/integration/conftest.py` keeps `db.create_all()` for now; commented TODO to
switch over to Alembic once the playbook owns the audit role.
- **M8** — Initial migration docstring no longer mentions `ttp_version`.
Verification on the latest commit: `ruff check`, `ruff format --check`, `mypy --strict`, and
`pytest tests/unit` all pass; 56 unit tests green.