Three docs still referenced the old docker-compose.yml path. Replace with compose.yml so a future reader cloning at this hash finds the file at the documented path. - CHANGELOG.md:31 — backend skeleton recap line. - docs/architecture.md:28 — deployment artifacts note (D-010 scope). - tasks/todo.md:9 — B0.1 task description. Also adds a "CI follow-ups (sprint 1+)" section to tasks/todo.md capturing the 3 MINOR + 6 NIT deferred from code-reviewer's review of chore/podman-and-ci, plus a FERNET-KEY tracker for the secret provisioning before c2_credential.config_fernet (D-004) is wired.
14 KiB
Mimic — sprint 0 architecture
This is the as-of-sprint-0 mirror of what's committed in
feature/backend-skeleton and feature/frontend-skeleton. It does not invent
beyond the code. When you read this and the code disagrees, the code wins —
file a doc fix.
Authoritative sources outside this file:
- Frozen spec —
RT-SecondBrain/Projects/Mimic — Spec.md(vault). - Implementation arbitrations —
tasks/spec-decisions.md(D-001..D-014). - Open questions —
tasks/open-questions.md(Q-003..Q-005, deferred).
Repository layout
mimic/
├── backend/ # Flask + SQLAlchemy + Alembic + Jinja sandbox + RBAC + CLI
├── frontend/ # Vite + React 19 + TS strict + Tailwind 4 + TanStack Query 5
├── docs/ # This file (architecture). ADRs land in tasks/spec-decisions.md.
├── tasks/ # Sprint backlog (todo.md), decisions, open questions, lessons.
├── CHANGELOG.md # Keep-a-Changelog flavoured.
└── README.md # Entry point + status + stack.
Deployment artifacts (Ansible playbook, prod compose) live outside the repo
in the RT infra repo (D-010). Mimic ships only Dockerfiles and a dev
compose.yml.
Backend module tree
backend/src/mimic/
├── app.py # Flask app factory (register blueprints, extensions, error handlers)
├── config.py # Env-driven settings (no hardcoded secrets — NF-network)
├── extensions.py # db (Flask-SQLAlchemy 3), login_manager, …
├── logging.py # JSON structured logger
│
├── db/
│ ├── base.py # Declarative Base + UuidPkMixin + TimestampsMixin
│ ├── types.py # Python enums mirrored to Postgres ENUMs
│ ├── models/ # SQLAlchemy 2 typed mapped classes (§8 aggregates)
│ └── migrations/ # Alembic env + initial schema (202605210001)
│
├── rbac/
│ ├── matrix.py # Permission enum + GROUP_PERMISSIONS (F11 source of truth)
│ └── decorators.py # @require_perm Flask decorator
│
├── auth/
│ ├── identity.py # current_user wiring (Flask-Login)
│ ├── password.py # bcrypt helpers
│ └── soc_token.py # 256-bit url-safe opaque tokens, bcrypt-hashed (D-006)
│
├── audit/
│ └── log.py # Append-only writer + hash-chain (D-013)
│
├── templating/
│ ├── sandbox.py # Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment
│ └── filters.py # regex_extract (google-re2, raise on no-match — D-011)
│
├── storage/
│ └── blob.py # CAS sha256 + gzip pool (MIMIC_BLOB_ROOT — D-012)
│
├── connectors/
│ ├── base.py # C2Connector ABC + dataclasses (Payload, TaskHandle, TaskResult)
│ ├── factory.py # Factory keyed on engagement/scenario c2_type
│ └── payload_map.py # payload_type → native command (Mythic populated, Home stub)
│
├── api/ # Flat CRUD blueprints (sprint 0 — no orchestration yet)
│ ├── engagements.py
│ ├── hosts.py
│ ├── ttps.py
│ └── scenarios.py # Enforces F3 invariant: host.c2_type == scenario.c2_type
│
├── schemas/ # Pydantic v2 schemas (request/response validation)
│
└── cli/ # mimic-cli (Click)
├── db.py # migrate / seed / dump / restore (NF-state R-O1)
└── user.py # user create
Frontend module tree
frontend/
├── src/
│ ├── main.tsx # Vite entry, mounts <App />
│ ├── App.tsx # Router root
│ ├── routes/ # Role-aware route definitions
│ ├── layout/ # Shell (sidebar, header, role-conditional menus)
│ ├── components/ # Wireframe components on mock data (F0.3)
│ ├── theme/ # Tailwind tokens (dark-first), Logo placeholder
│ └── lib/ # TanStack Query client + helpers
├── playwright.config.ts # E2E skeleton (no real auth wired sprint 0)
└── vite.config.ts
Persistence — §8 aggregates
| Aggregate | Notes vs spec |
|---|---|
user |
§8 + display_name, last_login_at (bonus, OPSEC R-O3). |
permission, group, group_permission, user_group |
RBAC layout (D-003, D-008). 3 groups seeded by migration (rt_operator, rt_lead, soc_analyst). |
engagement |
§8 + free-text description. c2_type default = mythic. |
engagement_member |
Role is a free String(40) — see "Known WARN" below. |
c2_credential |
Non-spec aggregate, arbitrated D-004 (Fernet-encrypted, versioned, rotation = insert + retire). |
host |
§8 verbatim. c2_type must match its scenario at run start (F3). |
ttp |
§8 + is_stealth_variant (R-O2 marker stripping) + is_published (TTP_PROMOTE F11). No ttp_version table (D-009 / H32). |
scenario, scenario_step |
§8 verbatim. (scenario_id, order_idx) unique. c2_type carried on scenario (H33). |
run |
snapshot_json (JSONB) is the single replay source (H32). |
run_step |
§8 + order_idx, resolved_payload_text (final payload with OPSEC marker — H34, audit-friendly). |
run_step_cleanup |
1-1 with run_step via UNIQUE(run_step_id). Status enum pending/success/failed/partial (F15, R-T5). |
detection, evidence |
§8 verbatim. |
report |
content_sha256 referenced in PDF footer + JSON + MD (H19, H24). |
soc_session |
token_opaque renamed token_hash (bcrypt — D-006). Bonus last_used_at. |
audit_log |
§8 + prev_hash/row_hash (D-013 — chain stored from v1, verifier in v2) + source_ip/user_agent/comment (forensic). |
Postgres-level OPSEC
- Audit append-only enforced at SQL level:
mimic_audit_writerrole getsINSERTonly onaudit_log;UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATErevoked fromPUBLIC. Idempotent grants in the migration; the deployment playbook (Ansible) creates the roles (D-002, D-007, D-010). - Hash chain (D-013): every row stores
row_hash = sha256(prev_hash || ts || actor_id || action || resource_type || resource_id || metadata_json). The verifier is not wired sprint 0; columns and writer logic ship so v2 enables enforcement without a destructive migration.
RBAC — F11 mirrored as code
backend/src/mimic/rbac/matrix.py is the canonical permission map. Spec F11
table is read 1:1 into GROUP_PERMISSIONS. The migration seeds exactly three
groups (D-008):
| Group | Permission count | Notes |
|---|---|---|
rt_operator |
10 | Includes ENGAGEMENT_READ (scope (assignés) to be applied at endpoint level). |
rt_lead |
All (~21) | ALL_PERMISSIONS. |
soc_analyst |
3 | ENGAGEMENT_READ_OWN, DETECTION_ADD, REPORT_READ. |
Two F11 cells got a finer split (no semantic drift):
RUN_START∥RUN_CONTROL— both lead-only, sum equivalent to F11 "Démarrer / contrôler".ENGAGEMENT_READ(RT, full list) ∥ENGAGEMENT_READ_OWN(SOC, own session scope).
Decorator: @require_perm(Permission.X) on every Flask view. current_user
resolved by Flask-Login (local password v1) or future Keycloak claim mapping
(v2). SOC analysts authenticate through a separate token-based middleware
(see "Auth" below).
Authentication
Two flows live side-by-side (D-003):
- RT operators / leads — username + bcrypt password (v1) + Flask server-side session. v2: OIDC Keycloak claim-to-group mapping, no app code change (the RBAC tables already accept any group name).
- SOC analysts — opaque 256-bit URL-safe tokens (
secrets.token_urlsafe(32)), bcrypt-hashed insoc_session.token_hash, plain token returned once in the API response, delivered out-of-band (D-006). Scope: one engagement. Revocation =revoked_atset; immediate effect via DB check.
Mimic itself listens on localhost; HTTPS, TLS, and IP allowlisting are owned by the existing RT Caddy reverse proxy (D-007). Mimic-side: no HSTS, no cert mgmt.
Cleanup templating (F15)
Jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment in templating/sandbox.py with two custom
accessors (D-005):
{{ outputs.text }}— pullsrun_step.output_text(stdout, UTF-8 with latin-1 fallback, silent refusal on non-decodable).{{ outputs.blob("<key>") }}— pulls a blob fromMIMIC_BLOB_ROOT, hard cap 10 MB.
Custom filter regex_extract(text, pattern, *, group=1, name=None) —
google-re2 (no backrefs, linear time), first match only, raises on
no-match (D-011). Templating drift fails loudly at step run.
Resolved command lands in run_step_cleanup.resolved_command_text (the
literal sent to the C2) and run_step.resolved_payload_text for the
payload itself (audit + NF-OPSEC marker visibility).
C2 abstraction
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ orchestrator (sprint > 0) │
│ start_step(run_step) → polling 500 ms │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ uses
▼
┌────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ connectors.factory (keyed on c2_type) │
└────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ instantiates
▼
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ MythicConnector │ │ HomeConnector │
│ (PR1 — pending docs) │ │ (PR2 — stub │
│ Mythic GraphQL+REST │ │ NotImplementedError)│
└──────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘
│
authenticate / list_hosts / execute_task /
get_task_result / cancel_task / execute_cleanup
(stream_task_output optional v1, exploited v2)
payload_type is a neutral internal enum (§7 of spec). Mapping to native
commands lives in connectors/payload_map.py — Mythic populated, Home empty
(blocked by PR2). UnsupportedPayloadType raised on miss → UI surfaces
"incompatible C2".
Storage — file pools
Two filesystem pools (D-012):
$MIMIC_BLOB_ROOT ── content-addressed (CAS) + gzip
└── <aa>/<bb>/<sha256>.gz run_step.output_blob_ref → <sha256>
$MIMIC_EVIDENCE_ROOT ── flat per engagement
└── <engagement_id>/<evidence_id>.<ext>
Per-blob cap 10 MB. No global quota v1 — OS-level monitoring (node_exporter). F12 archival CLI will own retention (post-sprint-0).
Sprint 0 happy-path flow (current scope)
RT operator logs in ── auth/identity (bcrypt + Flask session)
│
▼
GET /api/v1/engagements ── api/engagements:list_engagements
@require_perm(ENGAGEMENT_READ)
[WARN: scope (assignés) not applied — see below]
│
▼
POST /api/v1/engagements ── creates draft engagement
POST /api/v1/engagements/:id/hosts── seeds host inventory (manual v1)
POST /library/ttps ── creates TTP draft
POST /engagements/:id/scenarios ── composes scenario (c2_type fixed at create)
POST /engagements/:id/scenarios/:sid/steps ── adds ordered steps
│
▼
[orchestration, F15 cleanup, F7 cotation, F9 report : sprint > 0]
WebSocket cockpit, run orchestrator, cleanup wiring, report renderer, OIDC, and the two real C2 connectors are all post-sprint-0.
Known WARN — to revisit later
audit_logchain has no runtime verifier. Columns and write logic ship per D-013, but tampering detection is v2. Until then, the chain is a forensic trail (replay offline), not an enforcement trail. Owner: whoever picks up the H30 v2 ticket.engagement_member.roleisString(40)— free text, no enum. Risk: future drift. Watch when implementing F11 enforcement on themember.manageendpoints.GET /engagementsignores the(assignés)scope —@require_permalone admits any rt_operator. Scope-applicative check (engagement_memberjoin) is a code-reviewer item, flagged MAJOR by team-lead. Sprint 0 leaves the endpoint flat by design; F11 closure ships with that fix.- Q-003 / Q-004 / Q-005 deferred — see
tasks/open-questions.md. None block sprint 0; each carries are-open when …trigger.
Decisions anticipated vs v2 (for future-me)
| Sprint 0 ships | Spec said | Why |
|---|---|---|
audit_log.prev_hash / row_hash columns + chained writer |
H30 puts hash chain in v2 | D-013 — adding columns later is a destructive migration; verifier stays v2. |
c2_credential table (versioned, retiring) |
Spec §8 omits it | D-004 — separating Fernet-encrypted blobs from the application engagement metadata is safer than embedding config_json. |
Two storage pools (blobs/ CAS + evidence/ flat) |
H20 says "local disk v1" | D-012 — split keeps deduplication for C2 outputs and clean archival for evidence; OS-level quota only. |
| Group-based RBAC tables from day 1 | F11 lists fixed roles | D-003 + D-008 — preserves F11 semantics exactly while making OIDC v2 a config change, not a code change. |
Pointers
- Frozen spec:
RT-SecondBrain/Projects/Mimic — Spec.md(vault). - Decisions log:
tasks/spec-decisions.md(D-001..D-014). - Open questions:
tasks/open-questions.md(Q-003..Q-005 deferred). - Sprint 0 backlog:
tasks/todo.md. - Changes journal:
CHANGELOG.md.