docs: add api.md contract for sprint 1 + update changelog

- docs/api.md: contract the frontend consumes — base URL, auth transport (Flask session cookie, credentials: include), uniform error envelope, MA6 tenant-scope behaviour (404 not 403), per-endpoint shape for /auth/{login,logout,me} and /engagements GET/POST/GET-by-id, plus a worked example walking through CLI bootstrap → login → POST engagement → list → logout. - CHANGELOG.md: sprint-1 entry summarising the three endpoints, the dev- only CORS, the AuthUser extension, the audit rows, and the test coverage.
2026-05-23 04:22:03 +02:00
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+# Mimic API — sprint 1 surface
+
+This document covers the endpoints the frontend is expected to call in sprint 1.
+Everything is JSON, every protected route relies on the Flask session cookie set
+by `POST /api/v1/auth/login`. CORS is enabled only when `MIMIC_ENV=development`
+and `MIMIC_CORS_ORIGINS` is set (the prod reverse proxy serves the SPA on the
+same origin).
+
+## Conventions
+
+- **Base URL**: `/api/v1/`.
+- **Auth transport**: Flask session cookie (`HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`,
+  `Secure` in production). The browser must send `credentials: "include"` on
+  every request.
+- **Content negotiation**: requests and responses use `application/json`.
+- **Error envelope**: failures return `{"error": "<code>", "message": "<human>"}`
+  with the appropriate HTTP status. Codes are stable identifiers (snake_case),
+  messages are human-readable but not localized.
+
+| Status | Use |
+|--------|-----|
+| 200 | OK |
+| 201 | Resource created |
+| 204 | OK, no body |
+| 400 | Malformed request (e.g. missing JSON body) |
+| 401 | `not_authenticated` or `invalid_credentials` |
+| 403 | `forbidden` — authenticated but missing permission |
+| 404 | Resource not found (also returned for tenant-scope denials, see below) |
+| 422 | Pydantic validation error |
+| 500 | Internal — opaque, no leak |
+
+### Tenant scope leak prevention (MA6 — F11)
+
+RT operators only see engagements they are members of. Requests targeting an
+engagement they don't belong to return **404**, never 403, so the existence of a
+neighbouring engagement is not leaked between teams. RT leads see everything.
+
+## Authentication
+
+### `POST /api/v1/auth/login`
+
+Body:
+```json
+{ "username": "alice@example.org", "password": "•••••" }
+```
+
+`username` maps to the `user.email` column server-side (kept "username" in the
+HTTP contract so future identity sources can route through the same endpoint).
+
+Success — `200`:
+```json
+{
+  "user_id": "0c9e3a3a-7c8b-4d5e-9f10-1a2b3c4d5e6f",
+  "username": "alice@example.org",
+  "display_name": "Alice",
+  "role": "rt_lead",
+  "permissions": ["engagement.create", "engagement.read", "..."],
+  "groups": ["rt_lead"]
+}
+```
+
+Failures (all 401, uniform message — no enumeration leak between "unknown
+user" and "wrong password"):
+```json
+{ "error": "invalid_credentials", "message": "invalid username or password" }
+```
+
+The endpoint runs a bcrypt round against a dummy hash when the user does not
+exist, so request timing does not leak the username's existence either.
+
+Side effects on success:
+- A Flask session is established (cookie set, marked `permanent`).
+- `user.last_login_at` is updated.
+- An `auth.login` audit row is written.
+
+### `POST /api/v1/auth/logout`
+
+Requires an active session.
+
+- `204 No Content` on success — cookie is cleared and an `auth.logout` audit
+  entry is written.
+- `401 not_authenticated` if there is no active session.
+
+### `GET /api/v1/auth/me`
+
+Returns the current principal in the same shape as `POST /login`. The frontend
+calls this at boot to rehydrate the application state.
+
+- `200` with the `CurrentUser` payload when authenticated.
+- `401 not_authenticated` when there is no session cookie or the user has been
+  disabled since login.
+
+## Engagements
+
+### `GET /api/v1/engagements/`
+
+Lists engagements visible to the caller (`engagement.read` permission).
+
+- RT lead: all engagements.
+- RT operator: only those for which a row in `engagement_member` ties the
+  authenticated user to the engagement.
+
+Response — `200`:
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "id": "•••",
+    "client_name": "Demo Client",
+    "description": null,
+    "status": "draft",
+    "c2_type": "mythic",
+    "start_date": null,
+    "end_date": null
+  }
+]
+```
+
+### `GET /api/v1/engagements/<eid>`
+
+Same payload shape as the list element. Returns 404 if the engagement does not
+exist or the caller is not a member (MA6).
+
+### `POST /api/v1/engagements/`
+
+Creates an engagement (`engagement.create` permission).
+
+Body:
+```json
+{
+  "client_name": "Demo Client",
+  "description": "Internal Q3 drill",
+  "c2_type": "mythic",
+  "start_date": null,
+  "end_date": null
+}
+```
+
+- `201` with the created engagement.
+- `422` on Pydantic validation failure (returns the per-field error list).
+- `created_by_id` is set from the current session.
+- An `engagement.create` audit row is written.
+
+The RT lead currently does **not** get a per-engagement `engagement_member` row
+on creation; they see every engagement via the `is_rt_lead()` short-circuit.
+This will change in a future sprint when membership becomes the single scope
+authority.
+
+## Worked example
+
+1. Create a local admin from the CLI:
+   ```bash
+   .venv/bin/mimic-cli user create --email alice@example.org --type rt_lead
+   ```
+2. `POST /api/v1/auth/login` with the credentials — receive the user payload
+   plus the session cookie.
+3. `POST /api/v1/engagements/` with a body — receive the engagement.
+4. `GET /api/v1/engagements/` — see the new engagement in the list.
+5. `POST /api/v1/auth/logout` — session cleared.