Crypto + tokens
- app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost=
64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown
once, only the hash lives in the DB).
- app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access
1h, refresh 30d.
Services
- services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection
chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all).
- services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL.
- services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam),
consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin.
- core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed,
regenerate hook for /diag/reset.
API
- POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup
(status).
- POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me.
- POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> +
POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke.
- POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint
fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e
suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out.
Middleware
- @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session
closed before request handler runs).
- @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses.
Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here.
- flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on
/auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints.
Disabled in APP_ENV=test.
CLI
- flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force]
- flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder)
Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure
context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/.
Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so
internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's
deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs.
Frontend
- lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie,
automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook.
- components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx.
- pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}.
Testing
- tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total).
- e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total).
- tasks/testing-m2.md.
DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass
applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
98 lines
2.7 KiB
Python
98 lines
2.7 KiB
Python
"""JWT encoding / decoding.
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Two token types:
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- `access` — short-lived (1 h), in `Authorization: Bearer ...` headers, kept
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client-side **in memory** only (cf. spec §M2).
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- `refresh` — long-lived (30 d), in an HTTPOnly Secure SameSite=Strict cookie
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scoped to `/api/v1/auth/`. Rotated on every successful refresh,
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old `jti` revoked.
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We sign HS256 with `settings.JWT_SECRET`. The `jti` claim links each token to
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its DB row in `refresh_tokens` for revocation; access tokens are stateless.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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import uuid
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from typing import Literal
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import jwt
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from app.core.config import settings
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ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = timedelta(hours=1)
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REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL = timedelta(days=30)
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ALGORITHM = "HS256"
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ISSUER = "metamorph"
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TokenType = Literal["access", "refresh"]
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class TokenClaims:
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sub: str # user id (UUID as string)
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type: TokenType
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jti: str
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iat: datetime
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exp: datetime
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def _now() -> datetime:
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return datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc)
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def generate_jti() -> str:
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"""Compact, URL-safe random identifier (≈22 chars)."""
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return secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
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def encode_token(
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user_id: uuid.UUID | str,
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token_type: TokenType,
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*,
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jti: str | None = None,
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) -> tuple[str, TokenClaims]:
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"""Return `(jwt_string, claims)`. `jti` is generated if not provided."""
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now = _now()
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ttl = ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL if token_type == "access" else REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL
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claims = TokenClaims(
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sub=str(user_id),
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type=token_type,
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jti=jti or generate_jti(),
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iat=now,
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exp=now + ttl,
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)
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payload = {
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"iss": ISSUER,
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"sub": claims.sub,
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"type": claims.type,
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"jti": claims.jti,
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"iat": int(claims.iat.timestamp()),
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"exp": int(claims.exp.timestamp()),
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}
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return jwt.encode(payload, settings.JWT_SECRET, algorithm=ALGORITHM), claims
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def decode_token(token: str, *, expected_type: TokenType) -> TokenClaims:
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"""Decode and validate a JWT. Raises `jwt.PyJWTError` on any failure."""
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payload = jwt.decode(
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token,
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settings.JWT_SECRET,
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algorithms=[ALGORITHM],
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issuer=ISSUER,
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options={"require": ["sub", "type", "jti", "iat", "exp"]},
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)
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if payload["type"] != expected_type:
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raise jwt.InvalidTokenError(f"expected {expected_type} token, got {payload['type']}")
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return TokenClaims(
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sub=payload["sub"],
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type=payload["type"],
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jti=payload["jti"],
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iat=datetime.fromtimestamp(payload["iat"], tz=timezone.utc),
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exp=datetime.fromtimestamp(payload["exp"], tz=timezone.utc),
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)
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