Metamorph

knacky/Metamorph

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Knacky	ba976959a1	feat(m4): STIX parser + seed service + CLI - backend/app/services/mitre_seed.py: stdlib-only STIX 2.1 parser (urllib + hashlib + json). Pinned to enterprise-attack-19.0.json with sha256 df520ea0775a57db7bff760145b02fed89290802913e056b7ed5970b02f3626a (~52 MB, ~1.1 s parse). Resolves sub-technique parents via relationship[subtechnique-of] with a T1003.001→T1003 dotted-id fallback; upserts on external_id, rebuilds the technique↔tactic M2M in a single transaction so external readers never see an empty join. Persists mitre_last_sync, mitre_version, mitre_source_url in the settings table. - Custom URLs MUST be paired with expected_sha256 OR allow_unverified=true — refuses silent integrity bypass. - CLI: flask metamorph seed-mitre [--source path\|url] [--checksum-sha256 hex] [--skip-checksum]. Make target wraps it. - Docker: /data/mitre/ chowned to the metamorph user at build; named volume metamorph_mitre mounted from compose for cross-restart cache. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-12 13:53:53 +02:00
Knacky	700b563297	feat(m2): auth, JWT, invitations, bootstrap, RTOps SPA pages Crypto + tokens - app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost= 64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown once, only the hash lives in the DB). - app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access 1h, refresh 30d. Services - services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all). - services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL. - services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam), consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin. - core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed, regenerate hook for /diag/reset. API - POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup (status). - POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me. - POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> + POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke. - POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out. Middleware - @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session closed before request handler runs). - @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses. Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here. - flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on /auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints. Disabled in APP_ENV=test. CLI - flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force] - flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder) Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/. Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs. Frontend - lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie, automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook. - components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx. - pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}. Testing - tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total). - e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total). - tasks/testing-m2.md. DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-11 06:16:48 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Knacky

ba976959a1

feat(m4): STIX parser + seed service + CLI

- backend/app/services/mitre_seed.py: stdlib-only STIX 2.1 parser (urllib +
  hashlib + json). Pinned to enterprise-attack-19.0.json with sha256
  df520ea0775a57db7bff760145b02fed89290802913e056b7ed5970b02f3626a (~52 MB,
  ~1.1 s parse). Resolves sub-technique parents via
  relationship[subtechnique-of] with a T1003.001→T1003 dotted-id fallback;
  upserts on external_id, rebuilds the technique↔tactic M2M in a single
  transaction so external readers never see an empty join. Persists
  mitre_last_sync, mitre_version, mitre_source_url in the settings table.
- Custom URLs MUST be paired with expected_sha256 OR allow_unverified=true —
  refuses silent integrity bypass.
- CLI: flask metamorph seed-mitre [--source path|url]
  [--checksum-sha256 hex] [--skip-checksum]. Make target wraps it.
- Docker: /data/mitre/ chowned to the metamorph user at build; named volume
  metamorph_mitre mounted from compose for cross-restart cache.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-12 13:53:53 +02:00

Knacky

700b563297

feat(m2): auth, JWT, invitations, bootstrap, RTOps SPA pages

Crypto + tokens
- app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost=
  64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown
  once, only the hash lives in the DB).
- app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access
  1h, refresh 30d.

Services
- services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection
  chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all).
- services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL.
- services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam),
  consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin.
- core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed,
  regenerate hook for /diag/reset.

API
- POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup
  (status).
- POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me.
- POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> +
  POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke.
- POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint
  fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e
  suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out.

Middleware
- @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session
  closed before request handler runs).
- @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses.
  Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here.
- flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on
  /auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints.
  Disabled in APP_ENV=test.

CLI
- flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force]
- flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder)

Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure
context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/.

Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so
internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's
deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs.

Frontend
- lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie,
  automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook.
- components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx.
- pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}.

Testing
- tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total).
- e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total).
- tasks/testing-m2.md.

DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass
applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-11 06:16:48 +02:00

2 Commits