Files
Metamorph/backend/app/core/rate_limit.py

30 lines
987 B
Python
Raw Normal View History

feat(m2): auth, JWT, invitations, bootstrap, RTOps SPA pages Crypto + tokens - app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost= 64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown once, only the hash lives in the DB). - app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access 1h, refresh 30d. Services - services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all). - services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL. - services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam), consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin. - core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed, regenerate hook for /diag/reset. API - POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup (status). - POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me. - POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> + POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke. - POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out. Middleware - @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session closed before request handler runs). - @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses. Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here. - flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on /auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints. Disabled in APP_ENV=test. CLI - flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force] - flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder) Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/. Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs. Frontend - lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie, automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook. - components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx. - pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}. Testing - tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total). - e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total). - tasks/testing-m2.md. DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 06:16:48 +02:00
"""Shared flask-limiter instance.
Anchored on remote address. In-memory backend for v1 (single-process gunicorn
worker pool can drift; that's acceptable at this scale). M14 will switch to
Redis if it becomes a real concern.
The limiter is enforced in `APP_ENV in ("prod", "staging")` dev and test
deployments share an in-memory backend that's noisy across hot-reloads and
would gate the Playwright e2e suite at 10 req/min/IP. The spec NF-security
requirement is explicitly a *production* one (cf. tasks/spec.md §6
NF-security); a staging deployment is exposed to humans so the same limits
apply there.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from flask_limiter import Limiter
from flask_limiter.util import get_remote_address
from app.core.config import settings
limiter = Limiter(
key_func=get_remote_address,
default_limits=[],
storage_uri="memory://",
headers_enabled=True,
strategy="fixed-window",
enabled=settings.APP_ENV in ("prod", "staging"),
)