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Metamorph/backend/app/api/_validation.py

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feat(m2): auth, JWT, invitations, bootstrap, RTOps SPA pages Crypto + tokens - app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost= 64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown once, only the hash lives in the DB). - app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access 1h, refresh 30d. Services - services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all). - services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL. - services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam), consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin. - core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed, regenerate hook for /diag/reset. API - POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup (status). - POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me. - POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> + POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke. - POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out. Middleware - @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session closed before request handler runs). - @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses. Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here. - flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on /auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints. Disabled in APP_ENV=test. CLI - flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force] - flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder) Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/. Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs. Frontend - lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie, automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook. - components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx. - pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}. Testing - tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total). - e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total). - tasks/testing-m2.md. DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 06:16:48 +02:00
"""Lightweight email validator that tolerates internal/lab TLDs (.local, .corp, …).
`pydantic.EmailStr` relies on `email-validator` with `globally_deliverable=True`,
which rejects RFC 6761 special-use domains. Red-team and corporate intranet
deployments routinely use such suffixes we accept any RFC-shape email and
defer deliverability checks to the operator.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from typing import Annotated
from pydantic import AfterValidator
# Permissive RFC-shape pattern: local-part 1..64 chars, domain has at least one
# dot, each label is 1..63 chars of letters/digits/hyphens, total ≤ 254.
_EMAIL_RE = re.compile(
r"^(?=.{1,254}$)[A-Za-z0-9._%+\-]{1,64}@[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9\-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9\-]{0,61}[A-Za-z0-9])?)+$"
)
def _validate_email(value: str) -> str:
v = value.strip()
if not _EMAIL_RE.match(v):
raise ValueError("not a valid email address")
return v.lower()
Email = Annotated[str, AfterValidator(_validate_email)]