Files

63 lines
1.7 KiB
Python
Raw Permalink Normal View History

feat(m2): auth, JWT, invitations, bootstrap, RTOps SPA pages Crypto + tokens - app/core/security.py: Argon2id PasswordHasher (time_cost=2, memory_cost= 64 MiB, parallelism=2) + opaque-token SHA-256 helpers (raw token shown once, only the hash lives in the DB). - app/core/jwt_tokens.py: HS256, claims iss/sub/type/jti/iat/exp. Access 1h, refresh 30d. Services - services/auth.py: login, refresh with token rotation + reuse-detection chain revoke, logout (idempotent), change_password (forces logout-all). - services/invitations.py: create, preview, accept, revoke. Default 7d TTL. - services/bootstrap.py: seeds the 3 system groups (admin/redteam/blueteam), consumes the install token, attaches the first user to admin. - core/install_token.py: mints, persists in settings, marks consumed, regenerate hook for /diag/reset. API - POST /setup (consume install token, create 1st admin) + GET /setup (status). - POST /auth/{login,refresh,logout,change-password} + GET /auth/me. - POST /invitations + GET /invitations + GET /invitations/preview/<token> + POST /invitations/accept/<token> + POST /invitations/<id>/revoke. - POST /diag/reset: test-only kill switch (truncate auth tables + mint fresh install token). Allowed in dev too (with WARNING log) so the e2e suite can run against a make-up stack; production locked out. Middleware - @require_auth populates g.current_user (snapshot dataclass, session closed before request handler runs). - @require_perm(*codes): atomic perm union check; admin group bypasses. Perm catalogue lands in M3, scaffolding here. - flask-limiter: 10/min/IP on /auth/login & /auth/refresh, 5/min on /auth/change-password & /setup, 10–20/min on invitation endpoints. Disabled in APP_ENV=test. CLI - flask --app app.cli metamorph print-install-token [--force] - flask --app app.cli metamorph seed-mitre (M4 placeholder) Refresh cookie metamorph_refresh: HttpOnly + Secure (localhost is a secure context for modern browsers) + SameSite=Strict + Path=/api/v1/auth/. Email validation: app.api._validation.Email permissive RFC-shape regex so internal TLDs (.local/.corp/.test) are accepted — pydantic.EmailStr's deliverability check is too strict for red-team labs. Frontend - lib/{api,auth}.ts: access token in module memory, refresh cookie, automatic 401-retry via /auth/refresh, useAuth() hook. - components/{Layout,RequireAuth}.tsx + ui/{TextField,Alert}.tsx. - pages/{Login,Setup,Register,Profile}. Testing - tests/test_auth_flow.py: 15 integration tests (24 backend total). - e2e/tests/m2-auth.spec.ts: 8 Playwright tests (20 e2e total). - tasks/testing-m2.md. DoD: make test-api → 24 passed, make e2e → 20 passed; spec-reviewer pass applied (Secure unconditional, refresh limit 10/min/IP). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-11 06:16:48 +02:00
"""Password hashing and constant-time secret hashing."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import secrets
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
# Argon2id with moderate cost. `time_cost=2`, `memory_cost=64MiB`, `parallelism=2`
# is well above OWASP minimums while staying snappy on a Debian small VM.
_hasher = PasswordHasher(
time_cost=2,
memory_cost=64 * 1024,
parallelism=2,
hash_len=32,
salt_len=16,
)
def hash_password(plaintext: str) -> str:
return _hasher.hash(plaintext)
def verify_password(stored_hash: str, plaintext: str) -> bool:
"""Constant-time verification. Returns False on mismatch, never raises."""
try:
return _hasher.verify(stored_hash, plaintext)
except VerifyMismatchError:
return False
except Exception: # corrupted hash or unsupported parameters
return False
def needs_rehash(stored_hash: str) -> bool:
"""True when Argon2 parameters have evolved since the hash was created."""
try:
return _hasher.check_needs_rehash(stored_hash)
except Exception:
return True
# === Opaque-token helpers (refresh tokens, invitation tokens) ===
#
# We never store the raw token in DB — only its SHA-256. Comparison uses
# `hmac.compare_digest` to dodge timing attacks. Tokens are URL-safe base64.
TOKEN_BYTES = 48 # 384 bits of entropy → 64 chars b64url
def generate_opaque_token() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(TOKEN_BYTES)
def hash_opaque_token(token: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
def verify_opaque_token(token: str, stored_hash: str) -> bool:
return hmac.compare_digest(hash_opaque_token(token), stored_hash)